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According to the Stanford Encyclo-pedia of Philosophy (henceforth, 
the SEP), immediacy requires two cri-
teria: ‘The first one appeals to the idea 
of inference: something is immediately 
experienced or is given if the cognitive 
consciousness of it is not arrived at via 
any sort of inferential process. The sec-
ond one appeals to the idea of certainty: 
something is immediately experienced 
or given if the awareness of it is certain, 
incapable of being mistaken’ (BonJour: 
Fall 2001).
In their disputes with Brahmani-
cal thinkers the Buddhists tried to 
exclude any kind of mental construc-
tion (kalpana) from the realm of the 
immediately given. But, deprived as 
it is of mental construction, immedi-
ate perception becomes automatically 
incapable of providing any cognitive 
information about its object. That is 
why Buddhist thinkers had to prove 
that immediate perception (pratyak-
sha), in spite of its non-conceptual 
character, is still a genuine instrument 
of knowledge (pramana). How did they 
manage to reconcile the ‘blindness’ of 
pure sensation with its being part of 
the cognitive activity?
Units of becoming
The main goal of knowledge from the 
Buddhist point of view is to know things 
the way they are (yathabhutam) or to 
know reality as such (tathata). What 
then constitutes reality? For the Bud-
dhist the essence of reality is imperma-
nent (anitya); to exist means to change, 
because nothing has any endurable 
essence (anatman). Existence is being 
reduced to a stream of discrete momen-
tary dharmas. 
The term dharmas (in plural form) has 
no equivalent in Western thought; it 
has been interpreted in many ways: 
‘phenomena’, ‘point-instances’, ‘units 
of becoming’, ‘properties’, ‘tropes’ 
etc.. To know reality as it is means to 
know it as a series of dharmas. For 
the Buddhist this kind of knowledge 
is obtained in meditation and has a 
totally immediate character. In this 
way immediacy is obviously related to 
the religious soteriological perspective 
of the Buddhist tradition, but it is the 
immediacy of the common cognitive 
experience that was a subject of epis-
temological discourse and controversy 
among philosophers of different Indi-
an schools and traditions – Buddhist 
as well as Brahmanical. 
Particulars and universals 
as subject-matters of 
pratyaksha and anumana
According to Dignaga’s major epis-
temological work Pramanasamuc-
caya  (‘A Collection of Instruments of 
Knowledge’, henceforth, PS), only two 
mind-independent or mind-dependent. 
As far as immediacy is a kind of inner 
experience of mental actuality, it will 
be natural to accept that svalakshana, 
at least in some of our authors’ texts, is 
regarded as a sort of sense data.
Is pratyaksha a cognitive 
event?
To Dignaga, a pratyaksha (etymologically, 
‘before eyes’) is above all an immediate 
experience, and its immediacy proves its 
veracity and certainty. This immediacy 
is so important that he defines pratyak-
sha through the exclusion of mediacy in 
the form of mental constructions. Thus 
he calls it kalpana-apodham, ‘free from 
mental constructions’ (PS: 3c). In this 
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instruments of valid knowledge (pra-
mana) exist: pratyaksha, or perception, 
and anumana, or inference, and each 
of them has its own subject matter. 
Pratyaksha deals with what Dignaga 
calls svalakshanas, literally, that which 
characterises itself, a particular charac-
teristic or pure particular – something 
absolutely unique, singular and, most 
important, momentary (kshanika). As 
svalakshanas are ultimately real (para-
marthasat) and inexpressible, to experi-
ence them means to experience reality 
as it is. The object of the other pramana, 
inference (anumana), is constituted 
by conceptualisations, verbalisations, 
reflections and other products of men-
tal construction (kalpana or vikalpa) 
that Dignaga calls samanyalakshana 
– a general characteristic applicable to 
many objects or distributed over many 
instances. Samanyalakshanas, generally 
translated as ‘universal’, are endurable 
and not subject to change – for this rea-
son they are regarded by Buddhists as 
only relatively real (samvrttisat). 
The term svalakshana does not easily 
lend itself to interpretation. Its under-
standing is still a highly controversial 
matter among scholars. The problem 
is that its ontological status is quite 
ambiguous in our authors’ writings. 
The reason for this ambiguity was 
formulated by George Dreyfus: ‘Dig-
naga and Dharmakirti…are ontologists 
only inasmuch as their epistemology 
requires them to be. They even seem 
to feel free to alternate between several 
conflicting metaphysical standpoints. 
For example, in most of their works, 
Dignaga and Dharmakirti adopt a so-
called Sautrantika standpoint, presup-
posing the existence of external objects. 
In other parts of their work, however, 
they shift their ontological frameworks 
and move to a Yogacara rejection of 
external objects…Commonsensical lev-
els are introduced for the sake of con-
venience and withdrawn to be replaced 
by higher but more counterintuitive 
schemes’ (Dreyfus 1997: 49). A choice 
of ontological positions is equally appli-
cable to svalakshana: it may be either 
I I A S  N e w s l e t t e r  |  # 4 4  |  S u m m e r  2 0 0 7 2 1
> Research
[ a d v e r t i s e m e n t ]
way the first criteria of immediacy from 
the SEP is strictly observed.
If pratyaksha is construed by Buddhists 
as a direct experience (anubhava), does 
it mean that its immediacy consists in 
the activity of the sense faculties (indri-
ya) or in the contact of the senses with 
their object (indriya-artha-sannikarsha)? 
Buddhists accept neither of these alter-
natives. That a sense faculty cannot 
by itself possess cognitive activity was 
acknowledged by all Indian epistemolo-
gists (pramanavadins). And the major-
ity of Indian philosophers, except Bud-
dhists, saw in the sense-object contact 
the main condition of sense perception. 
Why didn’t Buddhists? First, for them 
not all senses could enter in direct con-
tact with their objects (they insist on 
non-contactualness of certain senses 
– the visual and auditory). Second, pra-
tyaksha is not necessarily a sense per-
ception. Among its manifestations Dig-
naga lists mental perception (manasa 
pratyaksha), yogic perception (during 
meditation) and self-awareness, which 
have nothing to do with senses. Thus 
we could safely say that immediacy of 
pratyaksha is not reduced to any sort of 
direct sense stimulation. 
Then how is it produced? Dignaga is 
not clear about this question. Accord-
ing to Dharmakirti, a svalakshana, or 
particular, possessing its causal func-
tion (arthakriya), can produce its own 
image or aspect (akara) in our mind. 
Does it mean that we really apprehend 
svalakshana at the moment of percep-
tion? Taking into account that all of our 
own cognitive devices – images, concep-
tions, words, etc. – are products of men-
tal construction, how could we say that 
immediate perception of particulars or 
of their aspects is a cognitive event? For 
Dignaga and Dharmakirti  the answer 
to this question is not simple. Being 
Buddhists, both of them reject the 
existence of Atman or Self  in a role of 
a permanent cogniser. For them there 
is no subject of knowledge apart from 
the knowledge itself, which is a flow of 
momentary point-instances (dharmas). 
So what makes an instance of pratyak-
sha a piece of knowledge if sense-object 
contact is not cognitive and conceptuali-
sation is cognitive but not immediate?
 
They might propose an answer con-
nected to their concept of svasamvedana 
as a variety of pratyaksha. Literally, 
svasamvedana is a self-awareness, not 
the awareness of the Self as Atman, but 
the awareness of the cognitive event 
itself, or self-reflective awareness. Dig-
naga distinguishes between mental per-
ception of the object, such as colour and 
other sense qualities, and self-aware-
ness of desire, anger, pleasure, pain, 
etc., which for him constitute mental 
events not dependent on any sense 
organ. Svasamvedana is a sort of intui-
tive experience (anubhava) that accom-
panies all kinds of mental activity, being 
itself free of any conceptualisation. It is 
sometimes rendered by the term ‘apper-
ception’, introduced by Leibnitz in the 
sense of the reflexive awareness of our 
personal cognitive experience as desir-
able or not. But that does not mean 
either that cognition is cognised by a 
separate cognitive act (otherwise, there 
would follow an infinite regression) or 
that svasamvedana, being a sort of intro-
spection, has other mental states as its 
objects. 
Is pratyaksha a true or an 
instrumental cognition? 
When Dignaga defines pratyaksha as 
exempt from mental construction, does 
he mean that the pramana of pratyaksha 
is a true cognition? The confirmation 
that pramana is not tightly associated 
with truth lies in the veridical status of 
anumana (inference). Being a mental 
operation dealing with mentally con-
structed objects, it could not grasp the 
true nature of the object and for this rea-
son is regarded as bhranta – erring or 
subject to errors. Nevertheless, it is still 
a pramana. Why? Because, according to 
Dharmakirti, it may reveal something 
previously unknown and may lead to a 
successful action. It is pramana because 
of its instrumentality with regard to 
practical tasks, including final eman-
cipation (nirvana). Thus we may safely 
add instrumentality to what we sup-
pose may be the Buddhist definition of 
immediacy.
Sketching a new definition of 
perceptual immediacy
Dharmakirti argues that when we 
think of an object, we have only a 
blurred cognition of it, whereas when 
we see it we have a vivid apprehen-
sion. But for him simple seeing and 
‘seeing as’, (perceiving an object as 
something), for example, a jug, con-
stitutes two different cognitive events 
that have different contents. One is 
perception without mental construc-
tions, the other is perceptual judgment 
somehow caused by this perception 
and assisted by memory. For Dhar-
makirti the perceptual judgment ‘this 
is a jug’, unlike inference (anumana), 
is not a pramana because it deals with 
something already apprehended by 
perception. But how does he explain 
our experiencing immediacy with 
regard to seeing something definite, 
like a jug? For him it is because of the 
kalpana (mental construction) that a 
cognitive image appears for us as a 
totally external thing (Pramanavart-
tika III: 359-362). One more distin-
guishing feature of kalpana owing to 
its mediate character is its lack of viv-
idness (Svavrtti to Pramanaviniscaya 
1. 31 ). Accordingly, pratyaksha is dis-
tinguished by its vividness (spashta), 
which may be construed as our fourth 
criterion of pratyaksha’s immediacy.
To this set of criteria one may add 
another: sarupya, the congruency of 
internal image with external object, or 
the fact that the knowledge takes the 
form of its object. To exclude the pos-
sibility of interpreting sarupya in the 
sense that knowledge may have only 
the form of the object, but not its own 
form (nirakaravada), we should add to 
our criteria the self-reflexive character 
(svasamvedama) as a confirmation of 
the fact that cognitive event has its own 
form as well. 
Thus, we can single out six criteria 
of immediacy from the works of our 
authors]: 1) non-inferential character 
(kalpana-apodham), corresponding to 
the first point of the SEP definition; 
2) non-erring character (abhranta), 
corresponding to the second point of 
SEP definition; 3) instrumentality (pra-
manatva) with regard to practical tasks; 
4) vividness (spashta); 5) congruence 
(sarupya) with its object; and 6) self-
reflexive character (svasamvedana). In 
this way, an acquaintance with Buddhist 
epistemology may suggest new perspec-
tives for our understanding and inter-
pretation of perceptual immediacy. <
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